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Abstract
Background: Mania is characterised by increased impulsivity and risk-taking, and psychological accounts argue that these
features may be due to hypersensitivity to reward. The neurobiological mechanisms remain poorly understood. Here we
examine reinforcement learning and sensitivity to both reward and punishment outcomes in hypomania-prone individuals
not receiving pharmacotherapy.
Method: We recorded EEG from 45 healthy individuals split into three groups by low, intermediate and high self-reported
hypomanic traits. Participants played a computerised card game in which they learned the reward contingencies of three
cues. Neural responses to monetary gain and loss were measured using the feedback-related negativity (FRN), a component
implicated in motivational outcome evaluation and reinforcement learning.
Results: As predicted, rewards elicited a smaller FRN in the hypomania-prone group relative to the low hypomania group,
indicative of greater reward responsiveness. The hypomania-prone group also showed smaller FRN to losses, indicating
diminished response to negative feedback.
Conclusion: Our findings indicate that proneness to hypomania is associated with both reward hypersensitivity and
discounting of punishment. This positive evaluation bias may be driven by aberrant reinforcement learning signals, which
fail to update future expectations. This provides a possible neural mechanism explaining risk-taking and impaired
reinforcement learning in BD. Further research will be needed to explore the potential value of the FRN as a biological
vulnerability marker for mania and pathological risk-taking.
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Introduction
Bipolar Disorder (BD) is characterised by episodes of mania and
depression, interspersed with periods of relatively normal func-
tioning. Pervasive impairments in decision-making are present in
all phases of the disorder [1–3], marked by increased goal-pursuit,
impulsivity and risk-taking activities with high potential for
damaging consequences in manic episodes (including substance
use, unprotected sex, gambling and spending sprees; DSM-IV-
TR, [4]). Psychological models are consistent with these features
being due to increased sensitivity to rewarding events, and argue
that increased activity in a Behavioural Approach System (BAS;
[5]) produces concomitant increases in manic symptoms [6,7].
Conversely, reduced BAS activation is linked to depressive
symptoms such as apathy, anhedonia and amotivation (see [7]
for discussion of the BAS dysregulation theory). In this way BD
may be associated with dysregulation in the processing of
rewarding outcomes. Factor analytic [8], cross-sectional [9,10]
and longitudinal [11] designs indicate that mania and depression
are relatively independent phenomena in BD. This allows the
underlying cognitive basis for mania to be explored separately
from vulnerability to depression.
Clinical populations of mania are typically in receipt of
psychotropic medication, and frequently experience hospitalisa-
tion and high rates of comorbidity, all of which present a challenge
to studying psychological processes associated with BD. Manic
symptoms are known to lie on a spectrum that extends into the
general population [12,13], making it possible to identify
individuals in the general population experiencing attenuated
symptoms. The Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) identifies
people meeting criteria for bipolar spectrum disorder but not yet
in treatment [14], and predicts clinical episodes after thirteen-year
follow-up [15]. HPS also correlates with trait measures of reward
sensitivity (the BIS/BAS scales; [16,17]). Hence it is possible to
study reward processing in populations exhibiting similar cognitive
biases whilst avoiding confounds from psychotropic medication,
hospitalisation and comorbidity.
Reward processing has been linked to mesocorticolimbic
pathways projecting from midbrain structures to orbitofrontal
and anterior cingulate cortices [18], with dopamine (DA) encoding
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both anticipation and experience of reward stimuli [19]. Abnormal
DA neurotransmission is a hallmark feature of BD [20,21], with
DA-antagonists ameliorating manic episodes [22] and evidence
that antidepressants may ultimately exert their therapeutic effect
via the DA system (e.g. [23]). Experimentally, mania has been
associated with aberrant reward-related activity in DA-rich
midbrain structures [24], although confounds from medication
cannot be completely ruled out. This is especially problematic
given that pharmacological agents act on the neural circuitry that
mediates reward processing, as illustrated, for example, in the
finding of disrupted reward-related activity following single doses
of an antipsychotic in healthy controls [25]. We have previously
found that functional activity in striatum in response to rewarding
outcomes was more strongly modulated by reward value in
a hypomania sample [26]. Similar patterns of activity have been
reported in clinical populations exhibiting impulse-control dis-
orders [27] and in healthy individuals receiving L-DOPA,
a dopamine precursor [25]. Event-related potentials (ERPs) offer
greater temporal resolution to investigate reinforcement learning
processes in (hypo)mania.
The feedback-related negativity (FRN) is an event-related
component that occurs as a negative deflection (260–320 ms)
and is implicated in motivational processing, appearing larger (i.e.
more negative) for worse-than-expected outcomes and attenuated
(more positive) or absent for better-than-expected outcomes (see
[28]). In this way the FRN may represent a system subjectively
evaluating outcomes along a good-bad continuum [29], which
therefore makes it a useful tool for probing individual differences
in sensitivity to reward and punishment outcomes. The FRN is
also linked to learning of motivational outcomes, with an
influential theory stating that its amplitude reflects a reversal of
the prediction error signal (the difference between the predicted
and actual outcome) generated in the midbrain [28,30]. Exper-
imental evidence generally demonstrates that the FRN conforms
to associative learning theory assumptions [31,32]. Therefore this
component is also a useful tool for probing reward learning
deficits, which have been previously implicated in clinical
populations of BD [33].
While the FRN has not been investigated in relation to mania,
depressive symptoms are associated with larger FRN (i.e a greater
negative deflection), most notably for losses and negative feedback
[34–36]. This is consistent with a hypersensitivity to adverse events
and a bias towards negative (self-)evaluation. Further, there is
evidence that the FRN elicited by positive feedback (e.g. monetary
reward) is also larger in individuals exhibiting depressive
symptoms (i.e. the FRN appears more loss-like; [37]). In this
way depression is also characterised by blunted reward sensitivity,
consistent with neuroimaging studies showing reduced reward-
related activity in midbrain regions [38,39]. Conversely, impul-
sivity is associated with a tendency to overvalue rewards [40] and
a failure to learn from the negative consequences of behaviour [i.e.
reduced punishment sensitivity; 41]. Consequently impulsive
individuals exhibit the opposite pattern to that described in
depression, showing reduced FRN for motivational outcome
information [42] and dampened error processing [43,44]. Further,
self-reported reward sensitivity, BAS and sensation-seeking are
linked to reduced FRN for both reward and punishment [45,46].
Finally, reduced FRN has also been reported in psychiatric
disorders characterised by impulsivity and risk-taking, including
alcohol dependence [47], substance abuse [48], attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder [49] and pathological gambling [50]. We
have also demonstrated in a delay-discounting paradigm that
immediate rewards elicit smaller FRN than delayed rewards, and
that this effect is steeper in individuals prone to hypomanic
symptoms [51], consistent with elevated impulsivity in clinical
samples of BD [1–3]. Collectively, evidence suggests that manic
symptoms would be associated with a similar FRN attenuation for
both reward and punishment.
Here we sought to characterise motivational processing in well-
functioning individuals with psychometric vulnerability to BD (but
with no psychiatric diagnosis), allowing us to exclude confounds
from psychotropic medication and hospitalisation, and to poten-
tially uncover vulnerability markers for the disorder. Because
manic and depressive symptoms frequently co-occur in BD (e.g.
[52]) and these features are associated with opposing perturbations
of FRN and other markers of motivational processes (see above),
we excluded depressive vulnerability so as to isolate electrophys-
iological markers uniquely associated with susceptibility to
hypomania. We hypothesised that these individuals would show
a bias towards positive evaluation of motivational outcomes and
impaired learning of reward contingencies. Given that the FRN
codes subjectively advantageous outcomes with reduced ampli-
tude, relative to disadvantageous ones, we predicted 1) reduced
FRN amplitude for gain relative to losses, and 2) that the
hypomania-prone individuals would show a smaller FRN for gains
(relative to the other groups), indicative of a greater hedonic
impact of rewards in this group. A second prediction was that
FRN deflection elicited by punishment outcomes would also be
reduced in the hypomania-prone group (relative to the other
groups), consistent with findings that aversive outcome processing
is dampened by trait impulsivity.
Materials and Methods
Participants
49 right-handed individuals (24 male, 25 female, Mage = 21.4,
SD = 2.41) were sampled from a larger pool (N = 652) of students
at the University of Manchester that had completed an online
battery of questionnaires (see below). An online screening
questionnaire was used to exclude participants reporting current
or past history of psychiatric or neurological illness and receiving
psychotropic medication.
Self-report measures
All participants from the larger pool had completed the 48-item
Hypomanic Personality Scale [14], 21-item BIS/BAS scales [16],
and 24-item Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; [53]. Both the HPS
[14,15] and BIS/BAS scales [54] have been robustly demonstrated
to predict BD, whereas the DAS has been shown to measure
depressive cognitive style [55,56]. Hypomanic and depressive
symptoms often co-occur in clinical [57] and non-clinical [58]
samples of BD. Hence, in order to isolate differences specifically
associated with hypomanic symptoms, participants with depressive
cognitive styles were excluded using a DAS cut-off of one standard
deviation above the mean (M= 98.5, SD = 17.8). Three groups
were then selected on the basis of their online HPS scores and
contacted to take part in the study. Using established HPS cut-offs
(e.g. [59,60]) we defined high hypomania (Hi-hyp; n= 17) by the
upper decile of the larger pool (N = 652). A medium hypomania
(Mid-hyp; n= 15) was defined by scores around the mean (M 6
SD), and a low hypomania group (Lo-hyp; n= 17) comprised
individuals with HPS scores in the lower two deciles. All groups
were selected to have near-equal distribution of male and female
participants and did not differ significantly in age [F(2,42) = 3.39,
p= .715].
Disrupted Reward Processing in Hypomania
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Stimuli and Task
Participants played a computerised card game, in which they
learned the reward contingencies of three cues (circle, square, and
triangle) associated with 20%, 50% and 80% chance of reward
(which are referred to as ‘punishment’, ‘50–50’ and ‘reward’
conditions, respectively). The contingencies carried by each shape
were counterbalanced across participants. Participants used this
information to guide their choices of how much to bet in pence
(23p, 16p, 8p, 3p). These values are in accordance with those
routinely reported in the literature [37,61–63] and were piloted,
along with the contingencies, to confirm that they elicit reward in
the present setting. After placing a bet, feedback was delivered
indicating whether the sum of money was won or lost (indicated by
an upward or downward arrow respectively). Participants were
instructed to maximise their winnings whilst minimising their
losses, and that they would be paid their actual winnings at the end
of the experiment. See Figure 1a for a schematic diagram of the
trials. The experiment consisted of four blocks of 90 trials, with
a five minute break after each. Of the 360 total trials, these were
equally distributed into the three categories (i.e. 120 reward, 120
punishment, 120 50–50 trials) and hence yielded six outcomes with
the following frequencies. Reward condition: 966 gain (‘expected
gain’), 246 loss (‘unexpected loss’); Punishment condition: 246
gain (‘unexpected gain’), 966 loss (‘expected loss’); 50–50
condition: 606 gain, 606 loss (‘50–50 gain’ and ‘50–50 loss’,
respectively).
Unbeknownst to participants, everyone was reimbursed £10
regardless of performance (the average profit made when the
paradigm was piloted).
EEG acquisition, processing and analysis
Continuous EEG recording was obtained from 64 scalp
electrodes using ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, Nether-
lands) and ActiviewH software (BioSemi, Netherlands). Pre-
processing was performed off-line using Brain Electrical Source
Analysis 5.2 (BESA; Gra¨felfing, Germany). Data was re-referenced
to the average of all channels and only trials from the second block
onwards were analysed, to ensure that participants had learned the
reward contingencies. Ocular artefact correction was performed
on the entire file using a cut-off of 6150 mV using an established
approached [64]. Any outstanding portions of the EEG file with
excessive absolute amplitude (.120 mV), voltage gradient between
two neighbouring data points (.75 mV) or low signal (,.01 mV).
Epochs were defined as 2500 ms to 1000 ms relative to the
outcome feedback (vertical arrow indicating gain or loss), with
baseline defined as the 100 ms prior to feedback. The data were
then averaged using a high-pass filter of 0.1 Hz (forward phase
shift). MATLABH 6.5 (MathWorks, USA) was used to pick peaks
for our ERPs of interest on averages (see below) filtered with a low-
pass filter of 30 Hz. Participants with fewer than 18 trials in each
condition were excluded.
Figure 1. Schematic of experimental design and behavioural data. a) Diagram of a single trial. Participants learned the reward contingencies
associated with the three cues (circle, square, triangle) and decide how much to bet (23, 14, 8, or 3 pence). One second later they received feedback
indicating gain (up arrow) or loss (down arrow). b) Percentage of optimal choices by group, cue and block. Optimal choices were defined as either of
the lower bet sizes (for the 20% reward condition) and either of the larger bet sizes (80% reward condition).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047754.g001
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The feedback-related negativity (FRN) was identified as
a negative deflection in frontal electrodes occurring 250–300 ms
post feedback. We measured the FRN as the peak-to-peak
difference between the P2 (maximum in the window 150–
230 ms) and N2 (minimum in the window 180–320 ms) using
an algorithm similar to Holroyd et al [65]. Hence FRN voltage is
always a positive value when there is an N2 deflection, and equals
zero if there is no negative deflection [65,66]. This approach
controls for the effect of the preceding P2 component on FRN
measurement. Supplementary analyses measured the FRN by
mean amplitude and difference wave (see Supplementary Materi-
als S1; Figure S2). Analyses were conducted on a frontocentral
electrode cluster (F1, Fz, F2, FC1, FC2, and FCz). All participants
had at least 16 trials per averaged condition and the mean number
of trials for final analysis did not differ between hypomania groups
(p= .788).
Statistical Analysis
Task performance was quantified as the percentage of ‘optimal
bets’ each participant made (i.e. one of the two larger bet sizes for
reward trials, or one of the two smaller bet sizes for punishment
trials). Participants that did not make these selections on at least
75% of trials in blocks 2, 3 and 4 were presumed to have not
learned the reward contingencies and were excluded from further
analyses. Proportions of choices were normalised through square-
root transformation [67] before using parametric tests. Group
differences in task performance and amplitudes on the electro-
physiological measures were tested using repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA). To dissociate whether the
processing of reward and punishment showed a specific relation-
ship with hypomania, we adopted an established approach [45] in
which neural responses to reward and punishment were entered
into the same step of a regression analysis with HPS score as the
outcome variable.
Ethical Statement
The study was approved by the University of Manchester
research ethics committee. Informed written consent was obtained
from all participants and the study was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Results
Personality and symptom questionnaires
In the screening sample (n= 652; M= 19.9, SD = 8.01), HPS
score positively correlated with the BAS subscales: drive (r= 0.268,
p,.001), reward responsiveness (r= 0.21, p,0.01), and fun-seeking
(r= 0.415, p,.001). These correlations were also present in the
final sample recruited into the study (n= 49, all p,.03) confirming
similarities between our sample and clinical populations on these
measures. Due to the DAS-24 cut-off, the final groups did not
differ on level of depressive symptoms [F(2, 44) = 2.02, p= .146],
allowing us to selectively examine effects related to susceptibility to
hypomania.
Reward learning task
Four participants (two Lo-hyp and two Hi-hyp) did not show
evidence for learning the reward contingencies and were excluded.
The final sample was therefore as follows: Lo-hyp (n= 15), Mid-
hyp (n= 15), and Hi-hyp (n= 15). All participants included in final
analyses (n= 45) were able to correctly identify the cues associated
with low, medium and high probability of reward when debriefed
after the task.
When normalised percentage of optimal bets was entered into
a two-way ANOVA with factors: cue (2), block (4) and hypomania
group (3), there emerged a main effect of block [F(3,120) = 51.56,
p,.001]. Contrasts showed that the final sample made signifi-
cantly more optimal bets in block 2 than in block 1 (p,.001),
confirming that learning had taken place (Figure 1b; mean bet
sizes shown in Figure S1). A block-group interaction [F(6,120)
= 3.23, p= .006] and a block-cue-group interaction [F(6,120)
= 2.58, p= .022] also emerged, with a main effect of group
approaching significance [F(2,40) = 2.59, p= .065]. Contrasts for
the block-group interaction confirmed that groups differed by
optimal choices in block one, with confidence intervals for the
marginal means indicating that Hi-hyp participants made fewer
optimal choices in block one than the other groups. The three-way
interaction indicated that although Hi-hyp participants showed an
increase in optimal choices between block one and two, this
increase was steeper for the reward cue than penalty cue, relative
to the other groups. A cue-group interaction failed to reach
significance for blocks 2–4 (p$.127), however, nor were the effect
of group or remaining group interactions significant for these
blocks (p$.095), indicating that all groups reached the same levels
of performance after block 1.
Electrophysiological results
Consistent with the literature, the FRN deflection was
modulated by both expectancy and outcome valence (Figure 2),
and exhibited a frontocentral topography (Figure 3a). An ANOVA
was carried out with two within-group factors, cued reward
probability (20%, 50%, 80%) and outcome valence (gain, loss),
and one between-groups factor: hypomania group (low, mid,
high). Main effects of outcome [F(1,42)= 40.58, p,.001], cue
[F(2,42)= 4.04, p,.03] and hypomania group emerged
[F(2,42)= 3.24, p,.05], as well as an interaction between outcome
and hypomania group [F(2,42)= 3.71, p,.04]. There was a trend
for a cue-outcome interaction, but this did not reach significance
(p= .11). Contrasts across all participants confirmed that the FRN
was larger both for losses (relative to gains), and for unexpected
outcomes (relative to expected: 20% vs. 80%; p,.02), confirming
that the task was appropriate for measuring neural responsiveness
to reward and punishment.
Between-groups contrasts for the main effect of hypomania
group showed that the FRN was significantly reduced in the Hi-
hyp relative to Lo-hyp group (p,.02). This confirmed that the Hi-
hyp group produced smaller FRNs across task conditions
(Figure 3b). The outcome-by-group interaction was explored
using separate ANOVAs for each group. Whilst a valence effect
was significant in the Mid-hyp and Hi-hyp groups (p#.001),
a trend for reduction in this effect in the Lo-hyp group (Figure 3b)
did not reach statistical significance in the Lo-hyp group (p = .081).
The main effect of group also remained significant [F(1,43)= 4.02,
p,.05] when a median split was used to divide the sample into two
larger hypomania groups: low (n= 23) and high (n= 22).
When the 50% outcomes were entered into a repeated measures
ANOVA (factors: outcome and group), main effects of outcome
[F(1,42)= 18.5, p,.001] and group [F(1,42)= 2.71, p= 07] were
again found to be significant or approach significance. To further
specify the relationship between hypomania and motivational
processing, FRN amplitudes for gain and loss outcomes were
entered as predictors of HPS score in the same step of a regression
analysis. Outcomes from the 50–50 condition were selected
because of equivalent reward probability and magnitude. The
resulting model accounted for 14% of the variance
[F(2,42) = 3.424, p= .042]. Whereas the gain FRN accounted for
a significant amount of this variance (p = .031), the loss FRN did
Disrupted Reward Processing in Hypomania
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not (p = .749), suggesting that vulnerability to hypomania is
particularly associated with neural sensitivity to reward outcomes.
Discussion
In this study, we identify differences in the neural processing of
motivational information in individuals vulnerable to hypomania.
The results provide further electrophysiological evidence linking
reward system alterations to risk-taking and impaired learning in
BD.
The hypomania-prone (Hi-hyp) group showed impaired learn-
ing of the reward contingencies in the first block, making
significantly fewer optimal choices than the other groups and
accruing the lowest task earnings. These results are in agreement
with decision-making and learning impairments reported in
clinical populations [68,69]. Poor performance in the punishment
condition may also indicate greater risk-taking predilection (i.e
placing large bets in spite of the odds). Indeed BD is associated
with risk-taking clinically (DSM-IV-TR; [4]), perhaps due to
reduced sensitivity to modulatory psychological factors when
making risky choices (see [69]). Although we did not collect explicit
measures of impulsivity in this study, susceptibility to hypomania
was also associated with increased self-report of subjective reward
responsiveness and novelty-seeking behaviours (BAS subscales;
[16]).
Across all participants, FRN was modulated by outcome
valence, appearing larger for losses regardless of how it was
measured. This is consistent with previous findings and the view
that this component represents the activity of a system evaluating
the motivational significance of outcomes (e.g. [66]).
In the main FRN analysis the low hypomania group showed
reduced neural differentiation of gains and losses, relative to the
mid hypomania group. This was driven by increased (i.e. more
loss-like) FRN for gains, a finding that has also been reported in
a sample exhibiting depressive symptoms [37], and is consistent
with a reduced reward response. The hypomania-prone group
showed reduced FRN for both outcomes, indicating a tendency to
experience both outcomes as more favourable than the other
groups (a positive evaluation bias). This effect was particularly
pronounced for rewards, consistent with recent electrophysiolog-
ical evidence of hypersensitivity to immediate reward during
a delay discounting task [51] and clinical accounts that mania is
related to reward hypersensitivity [6,7]. In addition, the present
finding of reduced FRN for losses fits with the reduced punishment
sensitivity hypothesis of impulsivity disorders [41] and may help to
explain the detrimental behaviours seen clinically in BD, such as
unrestrained spending sprees, substance use, unprotected sex and
impulsive suicide attempts (DSM-IV-TR; [4]).
Because bet size varied systematically for two of three cues
(participants chose smaller bets in the 20% compared to 80%
reward condition, confirming learning of the contingencies), FRN
differences may also reflect magnitude. Indeed some studies have
found that FRN is sensitive to magnitude, particularly for gains
Figure 2. Average waveforms for all conditions by group. Hi-hyp show reduced (less negative; more gain-like) feedback-related
negativity compared to the other groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047754.g002
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(e.g. [70]), whereas others find it is not (e.g. [71]), so we cannot
confidently conclude whether the FRN reduction observed in the
hypomania-prone group is driven more by expectancy or
magnitude. However, group differences in outcomes following
the 50% cue, which were equivalent with respect to magnitude,
suggest that it is reward expectation that deviates in hypomania.
This fits with findings that mania is associated with impaired
orbitofrontal representation of expected value – and not magni-
tude [72], and with clinical accounts of grossly increased
confidence that goals will be attainable and have favourable
outcomes [73].
Our results are also consistent with models of risk-taking as
arising from an imbalance between striatal activation and ACC
control [45,74]. Indeed the ACC, a major generator of the FRN
[61], is implicated in both affective processing and performance
monitoring [75] and shows abnormal activation in depression [76]
and mania [77].
Under reinforcement learning accounts of the FRN, the present
findings indicate altered prediction error signalling in groups
exhibiting either extremely low or high hypomania traits. This is
consistent with neuroimaging evidence of altered striatal pre-
diction error signalling in clinical [24] and analogue [26] samples
of mania. In hypomania-prone individuals, reduced FRN for gains
and losses implies increased (more positive) prediction error
activity (see [28]). A similar evaluation bias has been reported in
other clinical populations exhibiting impulsive and risky beha-
viours (e.g. Parkinson’s with impulse control disorders; [27]) and in
healthy individuals following administration of a DA-enhancing
agent [25]. In both of these cases it has been suggested that
increased positive prediction errors may induce a persistent ‘‘better
than expected’’ evaluation, leading to a greater impact of rewards
and a reduced impact of punishment (see [27]). This may drive an
expectancy bias towards positive outcomes, as we have demon-
strated in a separate neuroimaging study of reward learning in
hypomania [26]. Hence learning deficits and repeated risk-taking
may both arise from inappropriate reinforcement learning signals
that fail to update future expectations. This pervasive ‘‘rose-tinted’’
evaluatory bias parallels neuroimaging evidence that trait un-
realistic optimism is maintained by a selective failure to update
future estimations in the light of undesirable information [78]. An
alternative interpretation of group differences in the FRN when
viewed as indexing a prediction error [28], is that they are driven
by differences in estimation of the expected value of upcoming
outcomes rather than evaluation (post-outcome). The two stages of
processing are inextricably linked (prediction error updates future
expected value) and so cannot be differentiated by the current
design. Indeed this represents a conceptual limitation of FRN
studies in general.
A strength of this study is that it examined the relationship
between hypomanic symptoms and motivational processing whilst
avoiding confounds from depressive symptoms, medication,
hospitalisation or comorbidity. However, an intrinsic limitation
of this approach is that the sample may not fully represent the
range of psychopathology seen in clinical populations (although
see [51], which found a neural bias for immediate rewards in
a hypomania-prone sample where depressive symptoms were not
excluded). Additionally, whilst we cannot rule out that generalised
reduction of the FRN in the hypomania-prone group may be due
to reduced task engagement, the elevated traits of drive and
responsiveness to reward exhibited by this population [73] argues
against this interpretation. Our paradigm used free choice to
examine risk-taking and, as such, was unable to orthogonalise
reward probability and magnitude in all conditions. Also,
a relatively low number of unexpected outcome trials were
obtained (because they are intrinsically rare in realistic probabi-
listic tasks). A recent paper advised 20 trials for robust
measurement of FRN [79] – 2 more than in the present study.
However, the pattern of results did not differ for the 50–50 gain
and loss outcomes, which had the same probability and magnitude
as each other, and an ample number of trials to satisfy this
criterion. Finally, the positivity preceding the FRN showed some
task modulation (consistent with previous findings; [80]), which
likely accounts for the discrepant findings between the peak-to-
peak and difference wave measurement of the FRN. Nevertheless
this discrepancy is a limitation of the study and warrants
replication with, for example, a less complex task not involving
learning or free choice on bet size (see above).
In conclusion, we report differences in the neural processing of
motivational information in individuals vulnerable to hypomania.
The present findings are consistent with accounts that BD is
associated with reward dysregulation [7,73] and highlight a com-
mon neural mechanism contributing to risk-taking and impaired
reward learning. A positive evaluation bias may also explain the
elevated motivation, confidence, and goal-striving associated with
mania [73]. In addition, our findings here and elsewhere [26,81]
demonstrate biological vulnerability markers for BD. These may
ultimately lead to more quantifiable risk estimates [82], facilitating
early detection and intervention. Our data suggest that appraisal
and reflective consolidation of risky events may be a helpful
therapeutic approach.
Figure 3. Topography of feedback-related negativity (FRN) and
its modulation by group and valence. a) Topographical plot of the
50/50 difference wave (loss minus gain; 260–320 ms) shows typical
frontocentral distribution of FRN. b) FRN magnitudes for reward (gain)
and punishment (loss) across groups. The Lo-hyp group show similar
FRN morphology to the Mid-hyp group for losses, but larger FRN for
rewards (more loss-like) suggesting reduced reward sensitivity. FRN is
reduced in the Hi-hyp group for both gains and losses, suggesting that
both outcomes are subjectively experienced as more advantageous (i.e.
more gain-like), relative to the other groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047754.g003
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Supporting Information
Figure S1 Mean bet size shown by block and group.
Participants alter their bet size after learning the 20% and 80%
reward contingencies. Hi-hyp are slower to adjust their bet size in
the 20% reward (punishment) condition, consistent with slower
learning.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Probability-group interaction for mean am-
plitude analysis (260–340 ms). The Hi-hyp group show
smaller feedback-related negativity (more positive voltage) in for
all outcomes and additionally deviate from the other groups in
their processing of unexpected outcomes, showing smaller FRN.
(TIF)
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